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CRAWFORD AND DAVIS: A PERSONAL REFLECTION
Richard D. Friedman*
Thanks so much for the greeting. Thank you, Jim,1 for that very
gracious introduction. I have long admired Professor Duane's work, and I
am delighted to be here in a conference under his auspices. I thank also
the members of the Law Review for having organized this event. It is a
wonderful conference, and I am very happy to be here.
The evening after I argued Hammon v. Indiana,2 after we got home,
I complained to my wife. I said, "I am never going to have a moment like
this one." Even if I do get to argue another case in front of the Supreme
Court-which could happen, but who knows-it won't be my first, but
more significantly, it probably won't be as important. And it almost
certainly won't just fall out of my scholarship as much as my arguments
in Hammon were able to do. So I said, "It's as if this is my mid-life crisis
point," at which my 13-year-old daughter perked up and said, "Does that
mean we get a new car?" We still have the same beat-up cars that we
had. But it was a fun and exciting experience to argue before the
Supreme Court. If you ever have the opportunity, I suggest you seize it.
I have to say that when I stood up to argue Hammon I felt the wind
at my back. I was basically a lawyer with an easy case, and there wasn't
anything particularly unpredictable at the argument of Hammon. Now it
got a little bit interesting, as I will explain later, because to a certain
extent I was trying to argue the other case as well. But Hammon itself
was sort of ordinary, normal law.
There was nothing really quite as awesome as the experience that I
had a couple years ago sitting at counsel table as second chair at the
Crawford argument, where I wasn't able to say a word, but sitting there
* Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This
address was delivered on October 13, 2006, as a part of "Crawford, Davis & the Right of
Confrontation: Where Do We Go from Here?," a symposium hosted by Regent University
Law Review.
1 Addressing Professor James Duane of Regent University School of Law.
2 Hammon was the companion case to Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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and listening as the Supreme Court actually for the first time considered
whether to adopt the testimonial approach to confrontation, which
would, if adopted-and of course in the end it was adopted-cause such a
radical transformation of the law. That, to me, was just astonishing and
breathtaking to see happen before my eyes. And then, of course, when
the decision came down,3 it created, effectively, a whole new world in
this realm. It means a great deal has to be written anew, which I think
is very exciting. It is a wonderful time to be thinking about many issues
afresh, and these issues aren't limited just to the Confrontation Clause,
although many of them do concern the Confrontation Clause itself. One
thing let me say right off: I don't think it is a concern. I do hear it
expressed sometimes: "Oh well, the new law of the Confrontation Clause
is very uncertain; it may be open to manipulation and all of that." It is
awfully early. It is awfully early. The Court is just beginning this. I am
hoping that within a generation or so there is going to be a good, robust
understanding of not only what the Confrontation Clause is all about,
but how it applies in most situations.
Let me start by talking a little bit about this testimonial approach.
Testimonial is not just an academic choice of a term. The Confrontation
Clause says, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him."4 People say
this language seems to keep hearsay out, but it can't keep all hearsay
out because that would be impractical. So the question becomes, Which
hearsay is covered by the Confrontation Clause? And I think that is the
wrong way of thinking about this.
Hearsay, for those of you who have studied evidence or remember
an evidence course, is a massive concept-it is very, very broad. But
hearsay is not a creature of the Confrontation Clause altogether. The
confrontation right long predates hearsay law as we know it. The Clause
is an expression of an ancient right, a right that has been fundamental
to the Anglo-American system of criminal jurisprudence, and that in fact
predates that system by centuries. 5 It is a fundamental right as to how
witnesses testify. That is what it is about.
One could imagine many different types of systems by which
witnesses could testify. For instance, the ancient Athenians had
witnesses write their testimonies and put them in a sealed pot, which
would then be opened at trial. Continental European courts had written
depositions taken before a judicial officer and later presented at trial.
These are plausible methods by which witnesses could testify.
3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5 See Charles Nesson, Solomon's Sword: The Loser Gets Process, 19 REGENT U. L.
REv. 479, 479 (2006-2007).
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One could imagine saying, "If you want to testify, what you do is call
a special number (911 or some other number), or here is an address (an
e-mail address or a website) to which you send your written testimony."
Those are plausible ways in which a system could allow testimony or
require testimony to be given. But since the sixteenth century, the norm
in a common law court has been that testimony is given in one way. That
one way, in a criminal case particularly, is in front of the accused, face to
face. It is a time-honored expression that testimony be given "under
oath, subject to confrontation," and as the right to counsel developed,
"subject to cross-examination." That is the way witnesses give testimony.
The Confrontation Clause is a rule about testimony.
I am not particularly a textualist. I am not particularly an
originalist who gives preeminence to what the language of a clause of the
Constitution meant at the time that it was adopted. I think that many
clauses of the Constitution have to be interpreted and construed by
taking other considerations into account. But in this particular case, I
think the text of the Confrontation Clause does a pretty good job of
expressing what this fundamental right is all about.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." It doesn't say anything
about hearsay. It doesn't say anything about exceptions. It doesn't say
anything about reliability. It states a fundamental procedural rule that
has been central to our system: witnesses must testify in front of the
adverse party. If we are talking about a criminal case, the prosecution's
witnesses must testify in front of the accused.
So hearsay doesn't enter in. What we are talking about is testimony
because testimony is what witnesses do. In English we have two
separate words. We have witness, which is a person, and we have
testimony, which is what the person gives. In many languages they are
the same word, or at least the same root. For example, in French, a
witness is un tdmoin, and testimony is tdmoinage. And it is a nice party
game to ask someone to pick a foreign language, one that you have no
knowledge of, and almost certainly the word for testimony and the word
for witness have the same root. So if you don't like testimonial as a
definition, use the word witnessy or witnessish. That is what the
Confrontation Clause is all about.
Now, I have said that it may well be that there are other
constitutional constraints. And maybe in some cases those constraints
ought to be constitutional in nature-that is, in some cases it might be
that even if the Confrontation Clause does not keep a statement out
some other part of the Constitution should. But if a statement is not
testimonial in nature, then whatever reasons there may be to exclude
the statement, they are not what the Confrontation Clause is about.
What the Confrontation Clause is about, what the confrontation right is
2007]
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about, is a right to have witnesses testify in front of you, subject to oath
and subject to cross-examination. Any system that doesn't allow that,
that doesn't provide for that, is violative of the right.
Now, I want to emphasize the concept of system, to which I've just
referred. I think that the confrontation right is meant to ensure a system
of testimony providing an opportunity for confrontation. In looking at a
particular case, we should not ask, "Does this look like testimony as we
know it?" That is putting the emphasis in the wrong place. It is more a
question of, "If this is allowed, would we be creating an alternative
system, a different type of system, that allowed testimony without
confrontation?"
In other words, it doesn't make sense to say, "Well, the way that
statement was made, it doesn't look at all like testimony. There is no
oath. There is no formality. There is none of that. So it is not covered by
the Confrontation Clause." It wouldn't make sense, in other words, to
say, "If a person wants to create evidence for use at trial, all that person
has to do is call up a government agent, a government prosecutorial
agent, and say, 'Here is my testimony,' or, 'Here is the information that I
want you to relay at trial. I am going on vacation.'"
That may not look like testimony as we know it in the sense that it
is very informal. There are none of the protections that we are used to
thinking of, but those are all parts of the problem. If that is allowed,
then we have created a system in which this is how people can testify.
They can create evidence for use at trial by calling up the cops and
giving the information. I think we have to think in a functional sense
about what testimony is, functional in the sense of its role in the
procedure of adjudication. Testimony is basically creating evidence,
creating information, and transmitting information with the intention,
or the anticipation-that is another debate-that it will be used as part
of the prosecutorial process.
Looking at it that way, I think the Hammon case really was an easy
case. In Hammon, there was a domestic disturbance report. The police
went to the Hammon home. Amy Hammon, the wife, came to the door.
The police asked her what happened. She said nothing happened. They
asked, "Can we come in?" 'Yes." They found the husband. There were
clear signs that there had been something going on, some sort of
altercation. The husband said, "We had an argument. It never became
physical." One cop stayed with the husband. One cop went with the wife
in a separate room and asked her again what happened. This time she
made an accusation. The officer said, "Will you give us an affidavit?" She
agreed. The case was tried before Crawford, so of course the state court
said, "Excited utterance, present sense impression, whatever-it all
[Vol. 19:303
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comes in." And Hershel Hammon was convicted. 6 The trial lawyer did a
good job of preserving the record. Now that, to me, seems to be a very
easy case under Crawford.
Before Crawford, though, it was an easy case for the prosecution.
All you had to do was somehow persuade the court that the statement
was reliable, and that was a snap. All you had to do was bring it within a
hearsay exception. The excited utterance exception was very broad. The
present sense exception was very broad. The courts were very willing to
allow it all in. But once you have that transformation in Crawford,
saying that the Confrontation Clause is about testimony, then what I
think you have to realize is that the system we have created, if this
statement is admissible, is one that permits an accuser to make an
accusation to the police by talking to them in her living room. She never
has to take an oath; she never has to come to court; she never has to face
adverse questions. To me it is hard to see anything that is much more in
the teeth of the confrontation right than Hammon.
Davis was a hard case. There is no doubt that Davis was a hard
case. Frankly, I had qualms about it from the beginning simply because I
was afraid that if the Court took both cases there would be a tendency, a
temptation, to split the baby; and I think that is probably what they did.
I'll talk more about that in a minute. In Davis, there was a 911 call and
the caller, the complainant, Michelle McCottry, was in evident distress.
She told the operator she had just been beaten up. Actually, she began
by speaking in the present tense, saying, "He's here jumpin' on me
again." It does appear, though, that by the time she made the call, the
attack had ended. He had actually left at least the room, and very soon
he was out of the house.7
Davis was harder than Hammon. There is no doubt about it.
Because in this case, the event, if it wasn't going on at the time the
accusation was made, had just happened. When she is calling, she is not
in the presence of the police or of anybody else who could protect her.
The accused is not accompanied by the police; he is at large. All of this
makes it a much tougher case, and it is much harder to say that her
intention was to create evidence for use at trial.
Nevertheless, I thought that Davis should have won. One fact that
is striking to me is what the 911 operator said: "[The police are] gonna
check the area for him first, and then they're gonna come talk to you."8
That may not be actually what they did, but that was the nature of the
conversation. She wasn't saying, "Oh, no, no, no! They have to come here
and protect me." She never gave any indication that she was worried
6 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
7 Id. at 2270-72.
8 Id. at 2271.
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about her own safety within the next few minutes. Obviously, she
wanted Davis stopped, but it seems to me that she was looking for some
kind of intervention by the criminal justice system, such as enforcement
of the restraining order that was outstanding. It seems to me that if she
were worried that he was going to hit her again imminently, that the
thing that she would have asked for-the thing that the 911 operator
would have offered-was for the police to come to the house right away,
not go on a wild-goose chase looking around the streets of the city for
him.
The other reason why I think that Davis should have won, apart
from the facts and the sense that the information was being transmitted,
in part, for intervention of the legal system, was that I felt that both
cases could be resolved by the adoption of a simple rule-a simple rule
that I advocated while arguing Hammon but that would have worked
with Davis also. (I was hoping very hard that Davis would win.) The
simple rule, one that has a great deal of intuitive appeal, is that an
accusation made to a police officer or a law enforcement officer is
testimonial and is, therefore, within the core of the Confrontation
Clause. That is a principle, frankly, that my eight-year-old son is able to
understand quite well, and I am working on my seven-year-old daughter
as well. The basic idea is that you can't just tell the cops that somebody
did something bad and make it stick. You have to come to court.
I am speaking cheekily, of course, by referring to my kids. On the
other hand, it kind of bothers me that I have given so much of my
professional life to something I can't even make complicated. It is
something that a kid can understand. I do really believe that there is
something very satisfying about a constitutional right that can be
expressed in language that a young kid can understand. I think it has a
robust quality to it. When I explained the cases before the arguments to
people, they said, "The Supreme Court has to decide that? That is not
clear?"
I was hoping that the Court would adopt that simple principle, but
they didn't. And I think it reminded me of the "bends," the disease that
deep-sea divers get if they come up too fast. I think, in a way, that Davis
was creating a "bends" problem for the Supreme Court. It was just too
radical a transformation over too short a time from the pre-Crawford
regime. All of a sudden 911 calls, even the very first frantic statements
in 911 calls, wouldn't be admissible. I think it was just too much to
adopt. I confess that at an earlier time in my own scholarship I would
have been more hesitant to reach that result, but I do think it was
justifiable as a matter of principle and would have yielded a cleaner
result. But that is not the way they came out.
Interestingly, the Court was nine to nothing against Davis, and
eight to one in favor of Hammon with only Justice Thomas dissenting.
[Vol. 19:303
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The opinion by Justice Scalia bears lots of marks of compromise. I think
that, in the future, this will be regarded as one of those opinions from
the first year of the Roberts Court in which the Court was trying hard to
get consensus. After the argument, if one had shown me the opinion that
was ultimately issued under Justice Scalia's name, I would have been
astonished because some of what the opinion contained was so contrary
to points he had made at argument. That was startling, but I think that
this was an attempt to get the Court to speak together.
I will say that I was very pleased to get Justice Ginsburg's vote for
two reasons. One was that I would have been unhappy, given that these
were both domestic violence cases, if one of the votes against us in
Hammon was that of the only woman on the Court and a woman who is
an icon of the women's movement. The other reason was that, the night
before the decision came down, I said to my wife, "I think I might get
Ginsburg's vote." I thought she might go my way in Hammon because
that would make her look more reasonable in Davis, where she was sure
to come out the other way. My wife said, "The fact that you even think of
that as a possibility shows that you just don't understand women." So
that was very-
Professor Christopher Mueller: What is she saying now?
Professor Friedman: She still doesn't think I understand women,
but she will give me that anyway, you know. I would have rather had
five votes in Davis but that was easily worth losing Justice Thomas's
vote. I will say that.
I won't get into the particulars of the opinion very far, though I will
be happy to answer questions. I mean, from my perspective, there is
some good, some bad in it. One of the good things is that they clearly say,
with regard to Hammon, that it is an easier case. For those who thought
that maybe they were just going to limit Crawford to very formal
statements, it didn't happen-though they do seem to be flirting with an
idea of some kind of formality requirement. 9 We will see what happens
with that.
There are other aspects that I don't like at all. One of them is that
in regard to statements of identity-as in Davis, where she named her
assailant-the Court said in effect, "Well, this is important so that the
police can resolve this ongoing emergency," which is the standard they
are adopting because the police need to know the identity of the person
9 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278 n.5 ("We do not dispute that formality is indeed essen-
tial to testimonial utterance."); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and
Formalism of the "Testimonial" Statement Concept, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 429 (2006-2007);
Roger C. Park, Is Confrontation the Bottom Line?, 19 REGENT U. L. REv. 459, 459-62 (2006-
2007).
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to know whether they are dealing with a violent felon.1o I must confess, I
scratched my head at that. I said, "Well, wait a minute. Let me
understand. When the police respond to a domestic disturbance report,
unless they hear that this person has a prior charge against him, they
say, 'Oh, no problem, la-di-da, we don't have to take much precaution.'
But if they hear he has a prior charge, then they say, 'Oh, now we better
be careful.'" That, I think, is one of those aspects that is just a matter of
compromising. There was a good deal of trading back and forth. The
opinion is also murky as to whose perspective controls the question of
whether a statement is testimonial.1' We can talk about that a little bit
over the course of the next day.
It is important, I think, to resolve many issues that arise in the
Davis-types of cases, that is, cases involving "fresh accusations," which is
the way I think of accusations made shortly after the event. But in this
context we have two poles. We know Davis now is not going to be
considered testimonial. Hammon is. Somewhere in the middle there is a
line, and I think we are going to have the usual process of the Court
plotting out where this line is. We have got some sense of what is going
to happen there. But there are many other unresolved issues not
involving fresh accusations. Some of these issues are more open-ended
and, in that way, more interesting. So let me list a whole bunch of them.
First, if I were a prosecutor, which I am not, it seems to me that one
thing I would be pushing hard for would be to change regular hearsay
law to make all prior statements by a witness who actually testifies in
court admissible, as they are in some states, but not under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. I think it would be a bad change of law, but I keep
waiting for prosecutors to push very hard on this issue because under
the case of California v. Green,12 reaffirmed by Crawford, if the person
who made the statement is now a witness in court, it doesn't matter
what his or her memory is. It doesn't matter whether he is now
testifying in contradiction to the prior statement. As long as you have a
live body on the stand who happens to be the same body who uttered
that statement, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. Bad law, I think,
but I would think prosecutors would want to take advantage of it.
A second change that I think would be much better would be to
make depositions more readily available in criminal cases. Under Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal deposition is
still an extraordinary event. Some states make depositions much more
routine. I would think that prosecutors would and should want to take
depositions much more frequently to preserve testimony. Chris Mueller
10 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
11 See Park, supra note 9, at 462-64.
12 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
[Vol. 19:303
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is going to be speaking about early cross-examination tomorrow. 13 And
early depositions will raise a slew of issues as to whether it was too
early. Did this deposition, at this time, give the defendant an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine given further information that the
defendant obtained later, etc., etc.? One issue that is going to be ripe for
resolution very quickly is this: Is a deposition that was held for discovery
purposes adequate to satisfy the confrontation right?
Those are some legal changes-statutory rules-that one might
contemplate. Other issues that courts are going to have to resolve, and
ultimately the Supreme Court, are governmental reports, autopsies, lab
reports, and so forth. The courts are split on these right now, and I think
the Supreme Court is going to have to enter the area rather quickly.
Seems to me that these are clearly testimonial. They are made in
contemplation of use in prosecution. Whether the lab technician is a
member of the police force or not seems to me to be utterly irrelevant. If
that is the line, then we know what will happen: all of this work is going
to get farmed out to a private lab. Sometimes courts say, "Well, this is
routine." Well, so what? All that means is that you are routinely
violating the defendant's rights if you don't provide for confrontation.
There are going to be some tough issues, such as notice for example,
notice of deportation. If somebody is being prosecuted for attempting to
re-enter the country after previously being deported, and then the notice
of deportation is introduced from several years before, is that
testimonial? I think not, even though, I suppose, a fair number of people
who are deported do try to re-enter later. I think there you can say,
"Well, there hasn't been a crime committed, and probably a crime won't
be committed, because the vast majority of people who are deported do
not attempt to re-enter." So I think the notice of deportation probably
should not be considered testimonial, though I admit some doubt-for
why is this record kept except for the possibility that the person will
attempt to re-enter at some point? But an autopsy report? I mean, it
seems to me to be a clear case of a testimonial statement.
Next, burden-shifting statutes. Here again is an issue I think the
Court is going to have to resolve rather quickly. Some of these statutes,
particularly in the context of government reports, say the report comes
in, but the defendant can subpoena the officer who made the report. The
idea is that because you can subpoena the officer, you have
confrontation. I don't think confrontation is satisfied by giving the
defendant the ability to subpoena the officer. Frankly, that doesn't do
anything more than the Compulsory Process Clause. To secure witnesses
in your favor is a constitutional right. If the defendant wants to bring in
13 See Christopher B. Mueller, Cross-Examination Earlier or Later: When Is It
Enough to Satisfy Crawford?, 19 REGENT U. L. REv. 319 (2006-2007).
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the declarant, the defendant can try to do that. But if that satisfies
confrontation, then the government can try its entire case by affidavit if
they just say, "Here are our affidavits of everything that we want to put
in. If you want to call witnesses, you call the witnesses."
I really hope the Supreme Court slaps that down. My concern is
more than just prissiness of procedure. The opportunity to call a witness
as your own is just not the equivalent of the ability to stand up and ask
questions during cross-examination. If you want proof of that, I think the
demonstration is this: How often does it happen that the prosecution
puts a live witness on the stand who gives devastating testimony, and
the defense counsel, at the end of direct, stands up and asks some
questions during cross-examination? Answer: virtually all the time. Now,
how often does it happen that some kind of hearsay statement is offered
against the defendant and the defendant says, "Oh well, I'll just bring in
the declarant and make him my own witness and then ask questions"?
Virtually never. The reason is that it is foolhardy to bring that person in
and put him on the stand. The jury will say, "Whoa, the defense lawyer
must really have something up her sleeve to be doing that. This is going
to be good." Then what happens if the witness doesn't budge from the
prior statement? The defense lawyer has egg in her face. Most of the
time, defense lawyers are unwilling to take that chance. So the
opportunity to call the witness just isn't the same as the chance for
cross-examination, and I hope the Supreme Court will be persuaded of
that.
Next, capital sentencing. This is a very interesting issue: To what
extent does the confrontation right apply at the sentencing phase in a
capital case?14 Just focus on that. Some courts draw a distinction
between the eligibility phase-that is, the part of the sentencing phase
at which it is determined that the defendant can have a death penalty
imposed on him-and the selection phase-that is, the part in which the
jury decides the penalty that will be imposed. These courts apply the
confrontation right in the eligibility phase but not in the selection phase.
Perhaps that is justified, given the discretionary nature of the selection
phase. On the other hand, it seems to me that if the Confrontation
Clause itself doesn't apply throughout, some confrontation principle
probably should.
Here is what I mean: Let's say you have some kind of proceeding as
part of a criminal prosecution that is not the trial itself. So you say,
"Well, the Confrontation Clause doesn't apply at this hearing." The
14 See Penny J. White, "He Said,' "She Said," and Issues of Life and Death: The
Right to Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REv. 387 (2006-
2007) (arguing that the confrontation right "be given full effect" in all capital sentencing
proceedings).
[Vol. 19:303
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prosecution puts a witness on the stand and, at the end of the witness's
direct testimony from the witness stand, the judge says, "Thank you very
much, Ms. Witness, that was extremely reliable evidence and very
helpful to the Court. You're excused. There is really no need to hear any
questions from the defendant because your testimony was so reliable." I
don't think anybody would say that comports with due process. The
witness is there; the defense has to be able to ask questions.
Well, if you take the view that what the Confrontation Clause is
about is protecting the conditions of testimony, and that therefore
statements can be considered testimonial even though they weren't
made from the witness stand, then it seems that the confrontation
principle still applies in those other proceedings, even if the
Confrontation Clause itself is deemed not to. That is to say, Ms.
Witness's statements really are testimonial, and her testimony has to be
presented in a way that gives the defendant an ability to ask questions.
The interesting thing is, then, does this theory-that it is improper to
use a testimonial statement, even one made out of court, against a
criminal defendant absent a chance for cross-examination-apply to
other sentencing besides capital sentencing? Does it apply as well there?
Next-children. Golly. It is such a complicated subject. It gives me a
bad stomach because the cases are always so horrible, and I think the
issues are very, very difficult. One issue, which I know David Wagner is
going to address tomorrow,15 is the question of whether Maryland v.
Craig,16 which allows for child testimony from a remote location by
electronic means, will still stand. I think it is clear that Justice Scalia
would rather it not, but he has been delicate in his approach to this
issue. In Crawford, and in Hammon and Davis, we were delicate, too.
That is another fight for another day.
How do you deal with children? Will the courts tend to take the
perspective of the interrogator? For reasons I have suggested, and I can
go into more, I don't think that is the proper perspective. However, I do
concede that using the interrogator's perspective would avoid some of the
problems associated with focusing on the child's. If you say the proper
perspective is that of a reasonable declarant, do we say the reasonable
child? Well, I have three children, and I have come to the conclusion that
the term reasonable child is an oxymoron. A child of ordinary
understanding, fine. But is that the question? Or do we say that when
we use the term reasonable we are really talking about some objective
view where we wash out the intelligence and perceptions of the
15 See David M. Wagner, The End of the "Virtually Constitutional"? The Confron-
tation Right and Crawford v. Washington as a Prelude to Reversal of Maryland v. Craig, 19
REGENT U. L. REv. 469 (2006-2007).
16 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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particular person and just sort of take the standard issue person, one
size fits all? If so, is that the way we should deal with it even though it
concerns a child?
I have flirted with the idea that very, very young children are not
capable of being witnesses. I think that would be limited to very, very
young children. But I think that it is worth thinking about. My colleague
Sherman Clark has raised the question of whether children below a
certain level lack the moral as well as the cognitive development to have
the burden of witnessing imposed on them.17 I am not sure about that,
but I think it is worth thinking about. Finally, in the case of children,
the question of forfeiture is particularly pressing: Has the defendant
given up the right of confrontation by the conduct that might have
prevented the child from testifying?
That brings me to forfeiture. The basic idea of forfeiture is that the
defendant has lost the right. The Davis opinion in dicta talked about this
some. I have always taken the view that there has to be a robust
principle of forfeiture with respect to confrontation doctrine, and that the
defendant's rights ultimately are going to be better protected if there is a
robust principle of forfeiture. The courts will be more willing to have a
broad confrontation right if they recognize that it can be forfeited.
There are a slew of difficult issues. What kind of conduct can be
forfeiting conduct? Does it have to be conduct motivated by the intention
of preventing the person from testifying? Or are there circumstances, as
I believe, in which the conduct is so bad that even if preventing
testimony wasn't the intent or purpose, it is still enough to forfeit the
confrontation right? How is the forfeiting conduct proven? In particular,
can it be proven with the use of the challenged statement itself? What is
the standard of proof? Is it more than just a preponderance? I think it
should be.
Whatever the rules are governing the standard of proof and the
bounds of forfeiting conduct, I don't think it is going to provide much
protection to defendants. I think the key issue in this area is going to be
to what extent is the Court willing to say that the prosecution has a
responsibility of mitigating the problem. So, for instance, if-and I will
talk about this more tomorrow, I don't want to step too much on my own
toes 1 8-you have a murder case, and the witness makes a dying
declaration, to what extent does the prosecution have the burden of
trying to arrange for a deposition from this lingering victim? If there is
17 Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause,
81 NEB. L. REv. 1258, 1280-85 (2003).
18 See Richard D. Friedman, Forfeiture of the Confrontation Right After Crawford
and Davis, 19 REGENT U. L. REv. 487 (2006-2007).
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intimidation, to what extent does the prosecution have the burden of
trying to get the witness to testify, notwithstanding the intimidation?
Part of the conference title is, "Where Do We Go from Here?" I want
to suggest that I am hoping that we are on the threshold of a broad
reform of the law of hearsay not limited to just confrontation. It is a
pleasure to speak about this here, on the eve of my thirtieth law school
reunion, with my former Evidence professor, Charles Nesson, and my
fellow Nesson alum, James Duane, right here. We both took Evidence
with him, and we studied hearsay law.
Hearsay law has been around for the last couple of centuries or so,
maybe a little bit more. I am hoping that now that Crawford has
enunciated a confrontation right that is independent of the law of
hearsay, the law of hearsay as we know it will wither away over a
generation or so-within the professional lifetime of most of us in this
room. I am hoping for this change because I think the law of hearsay, as
we know it, does more harm than good.
I think that most often when hearsay should be kept out, it is either
because of the confrontation principle in criminal cases or for some
similar, softer principle in civil cases. But what about beyond that? Once
you enunciate a confrontation principle that is independent of hearsay
law, then it is possible to say, "Well, let's see, what other hearsay do we
need to keep out and why?" I think we would never in a million years
come up with a very complicated structure of hearsay law, with a very
difficult definition and with umpteen exceptions, which plague law
students and lawyers and judges alike. We would never do that.
The structure I envision is one where you have a firm confrontation
right in criminal cases, a somewhat softer confrontation principle in civil
cases, and you get to insist that witnesses testify under proper
conditions. And then, there is a very soft rule, a discretionary rule, as to
other hearsay, except in maybe some extreme cases where it is kept out
on other constitutional grounds.
Now let me say this: Many evidence professors have, over the last
few decades at least, barely taught the confrontation right. It is sort of
an afterthought in dealing with hearsay, and sort of shoved into a
chapter on the future of confrontation or hearsay law or something like
that. That is not as intellectually aggressive as it might be, but I can
understand it from a practical standpoint because the old confrontation
law basically seemed to say that if a statement was okay under hearsay
law, it was okay under the Confrontation Clause. So why bother? After
Crawford, however, that mindset is irresponsible. And after Davis, I
take the view that the Confrontation Clause ought to come first. It ought
to come first because it is what drives what is worthwhile about hearsay
law. And that is the way we ought to be thinking about it.
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Here are some preliminary thoughts about how confrontation and
hearsay law might be taught. We ought to first ask what is the nature of
the confrontation right. Crawford may not be a bad place to begin. It
says that you get to confront testimony given against you; in other
words, the whole basic idea is that we have a system of giving testimony
in which adversaries get to demand that the testimony be given openly,
in their presence, subject to oath and cross-examination. Then raise
questions such as, "What about a particular statement determines
whether or not it is testimonial?" Davis raises that. One can then talk
about business records and maybe things like autopsies-whatever.
Then ask: Should the Confrontation Clause be limited to those
testimonial statements offered for their truth? There are a few
significant cases, including the recent one of People v. Goldstein in the
Court of Appeals of New York,19 where the state said, "Oh, no, no! We
are not introducing the statement for its truth. We are just introducing it
because it supports the expert's opinion that the guy had sufficient
malice before committing the murder." And the Court of Appeals of New
York scratched its head and said, "That sounds like it is being offered for
its truth to us."
Then comes a question made salient by Crawford: In what
circumstances is the witness unavailable? The law there sounds very
much like it did before Crawford.
Next, was there an adequate opportunity for cross-examination?
Again, the question was made significant by Crawford. We can ask, in
what circumstances is an early deposition adequate? In what
circumstances does the forgetfulness of the witness at trial, or the failure
to speak consistently with prior statements, impair the opportunity for
cross?
Finally, we can address the possibility of forfeiting the confrontation
right. I think, within that, we bring in all of the dying declaration cases.
Now after studying all that, you have got a pretty good sense of
what the confrontation right is all about. Notice how organizing the
discussion around the framework of the confrontation right gives obvious
opportunities to discuss a lot of hearsay law. You can then look at the
whole area and say, "Now what else do we have to keep out, and on what
basis should we keep it out?" And maybe we spend a lot less time, even
in the interim, dealing with the exceptions than we do now.
I know people have said, "Well, you are dreaming." Yeah, I am. On
the other hand, I was dreaming before Crawford, too, and the rest of the
common law world has pretty much done away with hearsay law as we
know it in the civil context. They have kept it in the criminal context, I
think, because they haven't articulated what the confrontation right is
19 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005).
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all about. When they do that, I am hoping maybe some other common
law systems will follow Crawford. If they do, they may say, "You know
what, the way we have done away with hearsay law in the civil context,
now that we have an independent protection of the confrontation right,
we should probably do away with ordinary hearsay law in the criminal
context as well."
I believe that in this country, over the long run, now that we have
protected the confrontation right, we also can start dismantling ordinary
hearsay law. So, that is a long way from "where do we go from here," but
I hope it comes to pass within the professional life of all of us. That is
hoping that we live a long time, and reform happens quickly.
Thank you very much, and I will be happy to answer any questions
I can if there are questions.
Professor James Duane: You said there were some parts in the
Davis opinion that surprised you a little bit in light of what Justice
Scalia had said in the oral argument.
Professor Friedman: Yes.
Professor Duane: I gather you thought there were parts of the
opinion that maybe he really didn't have his heart in.
Professor Friedman: Oh, I think there really were.
Professor Duane: Can you give us some examples of the parts in
particular that he really didn't have his heart in?
Professor Friedman: Well, there are two that stick out most. One
is, in response to Justice Thomas, he said, "We do not dispute that
formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance."20 Now he doesn't
quite say we hold that formality is essential, but rather we don't deny
that formality is essential. In other parts of the opinion, he seems to be
knocking down the formality requirement, but he does have that
passage. And at argument, he was so good in saying things like, "Well
okay, forget about an affidavit. How about a letter? What if somebody
just writes a letter? I can give him my brief. Somebody just sends a letter
to the court, and you are going to allow that to prove a case?" He
understood that. He understood that it makes no sense whatsoever to
have a formality requirement. It is making a virtue of a deficit. That was
one of them.
20 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006).
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The other one that really amazed me was where he said that even a
statement of identity was really primarily for the purpose of resolving
the ongoing emergency, and therefore didn't make the statement
testimonial. 21 It just went so contrary to the whole tenor of the
argument. So after the argument, I said to somebody, as I have said
tonight, that I had felt the wind behind my back while arguing the case.
He said, "You didn't just have the wind behind your back, you had Scalia
behind your back pushing." At one point during the argument, I felt like
I could just sit down because he was taking the case so fully. That is not
the way the opinions came out. Very much a mixed blessing.
Thank you very much. I look forward to a full day tomorrow.
21 Id. at 2276.
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